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Abstract

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has made waves in the international
community, stoking global terror, influencing political discourse, costing hundreds of millions of
dollars in security response and reconstruction efforts. More importantly, it has cost hundreds of
thousands of lives, whether it be from direct combat or attacks, or from the massive refugee
crises it sparked. One wonders, how did a small extremist group make such a massive and
disastrous impact? Most research done on ISIS and terrorism studies tend to focus on the
political, economic, and social factors that lead to the creation and successes of religious
extremist groups. Fewer focus on the religious factor, and the ones that do typically argue that
religion is used as an excuse for violence, rather than playing an independent role as a core
reason for why extremist groups like ISIS form and function. This thesis explores religion as an
overriding factor in explaining the rise of ISIS and its unprecedented establishment of a
Caliphate. The analysis shows that the ideological division between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia,
beginning with the Prophet Mohammed’s death, manifested itself as a vicious sectarian cycle in
Iraq’s modern history and ultimately led to the rise of ISIS. This study also shows that ISIS is a
fundamentally religiously ideological extremist group, rather than simply a criminal gang
parading behind a false veil of religious labeling.
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Introduction

Trudy Raymundo and her employee were crouched beneath a table in a conference room.
As bullets whizzed past them, and fear paralyzed them, they were hoping that this was some kind
of dramatic exercise for active shooter preparedness, “to test our readiness.”1 As the bodies of
their colleagues started to drop around them, Raymundo said that “out of desperation” she
continued to hope that they were playing dead and were part of some kind of ruse. Reality began
to dawn on her when the shooting kept going, “For me it was just, “Why doesn’t he stop? Why
doesn’t he stop? Why won’t he stop shooting.”
About thirty miles away I received an alarming text message from Claremont campus
security: “The City of San Bernardino is currently responding to an active shooter
scenario…Campus community members are encouraged to avoid this region… we encourage
you to report any unusual or suspicious activity immediately.” The shooting in San Bernardino
killed fourteen individuals, critically injured 22, destroyed the lives of countless families and
friends, and for the students at the Claremont colleges, hit much too close to home.
The story of the shooting became sensationalized as it was discovered that the two
perpetrators, Syed Rizan Farwook and his wife Tashfeen Malik, had potential ties to ISIS.
Preceding the shooting, Malik had posted a message on Facebook declaring her bay’ah (oath of
allegiance) to ISIS. The Islamic terrorist group, which had shocked the international community

1

Cory Siemaszko and Miguel Almaguer, “ ‘Why Won’t He Stop Shooting?’ San Bernardino Terror Attack
Survivors Speak,” NBC News, December 7, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardinoshooting/san-bernardino-shooting-survivors-speak-n475756.
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less than a month before with the deadly Bataclan attacks, claimed that the San Bernardino
shooters were “soldiers of the caliphate.”
The “caliphate” it was referring to was the self- proclaimed state that ISIS established
when it captured Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul in June 2014. ISIS’ unprecedented landgrab
was the result of years of intra-state turmoil in Iraq. Capturing Mosul and a large swath of
territory allowed the group to show it could run an impressive administrative state which enabled
them to attract thousands of foreign recruits and globally disperse their propaganda.
Although no direct ties between ISIS and the San Bernardino shootings have ever been
proven, it is clear from Malik’s message that the terrorist group did not need to play an
operational role, as its influence was sufficient to inspire terrorist activities far from the Middle
East. The establishment of the caliphate gave ISIS said influence, as it achieved international
recognition, a platform to promote their philosophies, and a powerful image of dangerous
capabilities.
One might be tempted to think “why does this concern me? It’s a Middle Eastern
problem, right?” The answer is no, it’s a globally created problem with global impacts. For
example, Mosul is over 7,000 miles away from the Claremont colleges, and its influence traveled
and manifested in a deadly attack only 30 miles away in San Bernardino. Although this thesis
will not be focusing on ISIS’ global reach, I wanted to highlight the importance of studying
groups like ISIS in the first place. Even though they may seem far away and irrelevant, they have
a widespread impact.
With such an international influence, many have tried to understand where ISIS came
from. Most studies have found explanations rooted in political, economic, or social turmoil. I
will instead be asking the following question: To what extent does religion explain the
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conditions that allowed for the rise of ISIS and its subsequent creation and operation of its
caliphate. Rather than accept the widely shared view that religion is a veil for other core
explanations (typically the aforementioned), I will explore the independent role it plays. This
thesis will geographically be contained to Iraq, as this is where the group and caliphate emerge.
The first part of this thesis will first present existing theories on the rise of ISIS and
religion’s role, which will be either proven or refuted throughout the course of the thesis. I will
then examine the historical origin of religion in Iraq, then its sectarian role in Hussein’s regime,
during the American occupation of Iraq, during Prime Minister Maliki’s tenure, and finally in
ISIS’ creation. The second part of this thesis will be a close analysis of religion’s role in ISIS’
core ideology, state creation, and military strategy.

9

I. Theory

After 9/11 and Bush’s declaration of the unbounded War on Terror, terrorism studies
have garnered great interest and attention. Gary LaFree, director of the distinguished National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), said about this
change, “I’ve seen an interest in this topic coming from students and there was just about no
interest prior to 9/11.” Even though terrorist incidents are now on the decline, concern for
terrorism is still significant. A 2018 U.S. News World report states that approximately 35 percent
of over 21,000 global respondents prioritized terrorism over other issues, such as income
inequality, climate change, gender equality, etc.2 So when ISIS captured Mosul on June 10,
2014, it sent shockwaves through a global population that has become on high alert. ISIS’ rise to
power was unprecedented. No terrorist group, even al-Qaeda, has ever been able to create a state
like ISIS. Thus, many explanations and theories have been posited to explain its rise. Here I offer
a brief review of several pertinent theories that focus on the role of sectarian conflict and religion
as key factors in explaining the rise of ISIS. I will also review a few other established theories
(some preceding ISIS and even 9/11) that examine the socio-economic context that allows
terrorism to succeed.
Middle Eastern specialist, Vali Nasr published his book, The Shia Revival, thirteen years
ago with an ominous message: “The Middle East will not be defined by the Arab identity or by
any particular form of nation government. Ultimately, the character of the region will be decided

2

Sintia Radu, “How Terrorism is Taught Around the World,” U.S. News & World Report, January 23, 2018,
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2018-01-23/what-do-countries-teach-about-terrorism.
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in the crucible of Shia revival and the Sunni response to it.”3 Nasr essentially argued that the
struggle for power between Islam’s two major sects would be a defining factor for the Middle
East’s political landscape. Although many might argue that the Arab identity plays a strong role
(i.e. the Israel- Palestine conflict, tensions between the gulf states and Iran, or the strong
presence of Pan-Arabism), or that questions of nation government (i.e. the sweeping
democratization movement, the Arab Spring) do play a significant role in the region’s political
climate, Nasr argues that sectarian tension is the crux for explaining the Middle East’s
‘character.’ While this is perhaps a sweeping explanation for a region that faces a complex
multitude of tensions, it is a relevant argument to understand the rise of ISIS and the larger
sectarian-rooted conflict in Iraq.
In his article, “What ISIS Really Wants” for the Atlantic, journalist Graeme Wood further
reinforces that ISIS is at its core a religious group, refuting the belief that ISIS is a criminal
group which uses the pretense of religion to encourage its members to engage in violence. He
argues that Western ideology is not comfortable accepting this concept, for fear of stepping into
Islamophobia territory. However, it is exactly this misunderstanding of different interpretations
of a shared religion that has left us unable to understand and thus cease the group’s rise,
recruitment, and institutional value that allowed it to stay in power for so long. “There is a
temptation to rehearse this observation- that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern
political concerns, wearing medieval religious disguise- and make it fit the Islamic State.”4
While we may find comfort in the belief that religion cannot be at the root of such a violent
organization, Wood goes on to argue that “The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very

3

Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How conflicts within Islam will shape the future,” (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company: 2006), p.22.
4
Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, (March 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.
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Islamic… the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even
learned interpretations of Islam.”5 Thus, to understand how this group functions and
subsequently from where it may derive its success, we must first accept the religious nature of
ISIS.
While I will focus on the role that religion played in explaining the rise and success of
ISIS in general and specifically in Mosul, other factors clearly were also important. Other
theories have emphasized the role of economic grievances as a key factor. This argument would
support the aforementioned view that ISIS is a criminal group, only using religion as a means to
an ultimately non-religious end. While these perspectives in my analysis are not the core
explanation for the group’s rise and reign, they are worth mentioning as they do play a role in
understanding extremism.
The relative deprivation theory is a commonly accepted psycho-sociological explanation
for terrorism. This theory claims that individual mobilization of aggression is connected to
social, economic, and political circumstances. Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung, argues that
“the situation that is most likely to provoke aggressive behavior is one in which individuals find
themselves in a state of disequilibrium along various socio-political dimensions of status.”6
Several studies support this theory, showing a positive correlation between levels of terrorism
and levels of income inequality in various countries.7 According to this perspective, individuals
can be brought to political violence if they experience not just their own economic grievances,
but also perceive their own situation to be unequal compared to the economic state of a different
social group.

5

Ibid.
Galtung, Johan (1964) “A Structural Theory of Aggression,” Journal of Peace Research, no.2, (1964): 95-119.
7
Jan Oskar Engene (1994) Europeisk terrorisme. Vold, stat og legitimitet (Gaitherburg: International Association of
Chiefs of Police, 1978).
6
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Another common explanation for terrorism is the democratization argument. It is a widespread belief that democracies experience less violence, and while that is often true in inter-state
conflicts, it is not always the case in intra-state conflicts. It is not necessarily democracies that
are less prone to terrorism, but rather governments that enjoy higher levels of legitimacy. Often,
democratic principles--such as popular participation, free elections, and free speech--lead to
greater feelings of legitimacy. However, while Iraq is a democracy (in the sense of having free
presidential elections and a parliamentary system), it does not and often cannot enforce or protect
the aforementioned democratic principles. Democratic institutions which encourage political
representation can lead to a situation where majorities can quickly overshadow the minority
populations of a country, which can lead to significant groups feeling marginalized. Martha
Crenshaw explains that semi-democratic states (like Iraq) are particularly exposed to terrorism:
“In situations where paths to the legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the
regime’s repression is inefficient, revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely.”8 Essentially, the
relationship between the absence of internal conflict and effective governments is U-shaped,
with consolidated liberal democracy at one end and authoritarianism at the other, and with
democratic transitional governments in the middle. We will see that the lack of institutions and
strong central government in Iraq’s transitional democracy allowed for a rise in political
violence, which ISIS was quick to capitalize on.
In the following narrative and analysis, I will show how the religious components
outlined above played an overriding role in the rise of ISIS (including its success in Mosul) and
its subsequent creation of a caliphate. Other factors, notably weak institutions and economic
grievances, as I posited above, also played a role in the group’s success, but we will see that

8

Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, vol. 13, no.4 (July 1981), pp.379-399.
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these were actually by-products of a sectarian-rooted conflict and thus played a secondary role.
Thus, I argue that religion was the overriding factor in explaining ISIS’s rise and success in
Iraq.
To understand this important role of religion in explaining the emergence of ISIS, we
need to understand the centuries long division between the Shia and Sunni. For this reason, I
begin my analysis with a historical account of the origin of Islam’s sectarianism.
However, before we dive in, I would like to make one thing very clear: religion in itself is
not inherently violent. In fact, the Shia and the Sunnis have lived together in peace for centuries,
and the majority have respectful relationships with one another. I am not arguing that religion,
specifically Islam, is based on conflict or violence. Rather, the majority who practice it
understand it to be a religion that promotes peace. However, we will be looking at the minority
who engage in violent religious extremism, so we will be analyzing religion in a framework of
conflict and violence.
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II. Islam’s Schism

“I cannot count them.”9 Abdullah Hatam, a morgue attendant in Baghdad, chillingly
described the bits of human flesh and body parts that were strewn across the Al- Kadhimiya
Mosque. On March 2, 2004, two men had calmly walked into the massive crowd of Shia
worshippers gathered at the Imam Musa al- Khadam shrine, which is housed within the mosque,
and detonated their suicide vests, killing 58 people and wounding over 200.10 The attack was one
of two that day (the second attack occurred in Karbala and killed an estimated 85) and was the
deadliest day in Iraq since May 1, 2003, when President Bush had announced an end to major
combat operations. The perpetrators were quickly found to be the Sunni insurgency group, alQaeda in Iraq. The targets were Shia men, women, and children, who had flocked to shrines in
Karbala and Baghdad, to worship on the holiest Shia Muslim day of the year, Ashura. As the
worshippers quickly turned mourners searched for their family and friends in the erupting chaos,
American tanks arrived on the scene. Angry mobs quickly encircled them, blaming the lack of
U.S. security for the deadly attacks. American military, which was present in virtually every
other corner of Baghdad, had stayed away from the shrines out of respect for what one general
called “cultural differences.”11 Paul Bremer, the administrator for the coalition authority in Iraq
stated that the attacks were part of “an effort to provoke sectarian violence among Muslims. We
know they chose this day so that they could kill as many innocents as possible.”12 Americans

9

John F. Burns and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Blasts at Shia Ceremonies in Iraq Kill More Than 140,” The New York
Times, March 2, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/02/international/middleeast/blasts-at-Shia-ceremonies-iniraq-kill-more-than.html.
10
Jane Arraf and Brent Sadler, “Deadly attacks rock Baghdad, Karbala,” CNN, March 2, 2004
https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/03/02/sprj.nirq.main/.
11
Burns and Gettleman “Blasts at Shia Ceremonies in Iraq Kill More Than 140.”
12
Jim Garamone , “White House, Coalition Say Attacks Won’t Stop New Iraq,” U.S. Department of Defense, March
2, 2004, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27132.
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quickly grouped these attacks under a sectarian label, which had become a favorite term to use to
describe Iraq’s rocky and violent religious-political terrain. The Ashura bombings were indeed a
sectarian attack (one instigated by one religious sect against another, purely do the differing
sectarian identities), part of a campaign of sectarian violence that was sweeping the country.
However, the quick American labeling of “sectarian” can only describe a surface level
understanding of the Sunni- Shia divide that shaped Iraq. As I will explain later, American
political involvement in Iraq was detrimental because of a lack of sectarian understanding, which
was instead often written off as “cultural differences.” I will attempt not to commit similar errors
by looking at the intrinsically religious nature of the sectarian issues in Iraq, rather than solely
use it as a political descriptor. Scholar Lesley Hazleton illustrates, “We tend to say impatiently,
‘Why can’t they all just get along?’ But in Iraq… what happened centuries ago is alive and fresh
as though it had happened just yesterday.”13
Understanding the history, beliefs, and customs that define these two sects of Islam will
allow us to better discern their roles in Iraq’s modern violent political landscape. Thus, to discern
the role that religion plays in explaining the rise and success of ISIS, we will start our story not
in 2014 when ISIS established its caliphate, but rather in 632 A.D. when Islam began to schism.

The Sunni- Shia conflict began 1,372 years before the horrific Ashura attacks. The
schism sprung from a succession dispute following the Prophet Mohammed’s death in 632 A.D.
Mohammed, who was the founder of, and thus uncontested leader of Islam left no natural heir or
clear will detailing his succession. Thus, a leadership dispute began the centuries old divide.

13

Alyssa Fetini, “Understanding the Sunni- Shi’ite Divide,” Time, September 16, 2009,
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1924116,00.html.
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However, the original choices for succession are very telling of the characteristics that shape
both sects.
Although he left no son, Mohammed’s closest male heir seemed to many to be the natural
choice. His cousin and son in law, Ali ibn Abi Talib, was chosen by a group of followers who
called themselves the Shiat Ali,14 (followers of Ali) shortened to the Shia. The Shia believed that
the succession should be hereditary, rather than by consensus. Vali Nasr explains why heredity
was so important: “Shias believe that the Prophet possessed special spiritual qualities… that Ali
and his descendants had these special spiritual qualities too.”15 Ali was also regarded as a
religious authority and revered theologist. According to a hadith,16 Mohammed said “I’m the city
of knowledge and Ali is its gate.” Shias thus not only chose Ali as Mohammed’s successor
because of his hereditary legitimacy, but also because of his moral authority. As Nasr continues
to write on Shia leaders, “They could understand and interpret the inner meaning of Islam, as
opposed to merely implementing its outward manifestations.”17 Shias’ prioritization of
spirituality over the actionable aspects of Islam are crucial in understanding the main difference
in Muslim sects. Ali was not chosen as the successor but would become the fourth caliph. He
would later be assassinated by Sunni extremists, which would be the catalyst for much of the
violence that has marked the sectarian divide in Islam. After his death, the Muslim world split in
two: the Abbasids and the Umayyads. The Shia fell under the Abbasids, who believed that only
Ali’s blood descendants could be legitimate leaders.

14

Ibid.
Nasr, p.39
16
Report of the words and deeds of Mohammed and other early Muslims; considered an authoritative source of
revelation; second only to the Quran (Oxford Islamic Studies)
17
Nasr, p.39.
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Disagreeing with the Shia, another group believed that Mohammed’s successor should be
chosen based on his merit rather than heredity; a much more political approach. This group
argued that Mohammed’s successor “would need no exceptional spiritual qualities but would
merely have to be an exemplary Muslim.”18 This group called themselves “Ahl-as-Sunnah”
meaning people of the tradition. Sunnis now describe it as “the way of the prophet.” They
believed that Abu Bakr, Mohammed’s father in law and close friend was the rightful heir.
Ultimately, he won, as all dissenters, including Ali, consented to his legitimate succession as
caliph. Abu Bakr was succeeded by Umar, Uthman, and eventually Ali. Sunnis regard the reign
of these caliphs, as well as the Umayyad dynasty, as Islam’s golden age.
Contrary to the Shia’s focus on spirituality, the Sunnis favored tradition and civil order.
Nasr writes, “The Sunni conception of authority has centered on a preoccupation with order.
Religion does not depend on the quality of political authority but on its ability to help the faith
survive and grow.”19 Almost anthitecal to the Shia’s emphasis on religious authority as political
leadership, Sunnis believe that the two are separate and that the latter is meant to promote the
former. Nasr justly characterizes the Sunnis prioritization of law and order with the famous
saying “Better sixty years of tyranny than a single day of civil strife.”20
In terms of population, Sunnis overwhelmingly eclipse the Shia population. According to
the Pew research center,21 globally, about 87 – 90 percent of Muslims identify as Sunni,
compared to only 10-13 percent who identify as Shia.22 One might thus wonder, how much
conflict can arise between the two when the Sunnis clearly dominate. The response is that the

18

Nasr, p. 35.
Nasr, p.39.
20
Nasr, p.36
21
Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Research Center, October 7,
2009.
22
Ibid.
19
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Shia are not evenly dispersed, rather they are concentrated in certain geographical locations,
where they either form a majority or significant minority of the population. For example, over a
third of the world’s Shias live in Iran, where they account for almost 95% of the Muslim
population,23 and in which Shiism plays a large role in government. Including Iran, only 5
countries boast a Shia population that comprises over 50% of their Muslim population:
Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Bahrain, and most important for our purposes, Iraq. Approximately 65-70
percent of Shias make up Iraq’s Muslim population, making them the clear majority. That said,
unlike Iran, the Sunnis still make up a formidable minority at 35%. Iraq is considered one of the
most important countries for sectarianism. Hazleton describes Iraq as “the cradle of Shi’ism,”
eluding to key events such as Ali’s death which took place in Najaf (just south of Baghdad) and
his son Husayn’s death which occurred in the aforementioned city of Karbala. “So if there is one
place the rift between Shi’ites and Sunnis has always been most volatile, it is Iraq.”24
The two most significant outcomes to take away from the inception of this religious
schism is that (1) Shias have felt threatened, especially politically, since Ali’s assassination by
the Sunni extremist and (2) there are inherent ideological differences between the Sunnis and the
Shia, which continue to mark Iraq’s political and social climates.

23
24

Ibid.
Fetini, “Understanding the Sunni- Shi’ite Divide.”
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III. Saddam’s Sectarian Brand

The aforementioned Ashura attacks which took place in Baghdad and Karbala, were not
the first time Karbala had been the target of violence. Thirteen years earlier, in 1991, the shrine
in Karbala was ravaged by shellings. The shrine was for Husayn, Ali’s son, and is one of the
most important Shia monuments. Standing on a tank outside Husayn’s tomb, a man shouted
“Your name is Hussein and so is mine. Let us see who is stronger now.”25 That man was Kamal
Hussein Majid, one of Saddam Hussein’s confidantes, and who he had sent to Karbala to
violently suppress a Shia uprising. This event, known as the 1991 Karbala massacre, was one of
many in a vicious anti-Shia campaign during Saddam Hussein’s regime.
A staunch nationalist, Hussein adopted the Ba’ath party in Iraq. Ba’athism was a political
ideology and party that was sweeping through the Arab world as a post-colonial nationalist
movement. It was “authoritarian, somewhat mystical, vaguely socialistic, but determinedly panArabist.”26 The founder of Ba’athism, Michel Aflaq, believed that Arab nations would decline if
they did not unify, and unification was threatened by the following ailments, “feudalism,
sectarianism, regionalism, and intellectual reactionism.”27. Even though Ba’athism was meant to
be secular, in order to foster unification and address the aforementioned ‘ailments’, Ba’athism
took on its unique interpretation of Islam. According to Aflaq (who was interestingly Christian),
“Islam … was an Arab movement, and its meaning was to renew Arabism and to complete it.
The language in which it came down [to Muhammad] was Arabic, its view and understanding

25

Paul Lewis, “Karabala Journal; Who Hit the Mosques? Not us, Baghdad Says,” The New York Times, August 13,
1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/13/world/karbala-journal-who-hit-the-mosques-not-us-baghdad-says.html.
26
William R. Polk, “Understanding Iraq” (New York: Harper Perennial: 2005), 109.
27
Paul Salem (1994). Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World. Syracuse University, p.61-62.
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were of the Arab mind.”28 To Ba’athists, Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism went hand in hand.
Islam’s role in Hussein’s regime was thus a tool in Arab unification. Rather than destroy Iraq’s
religious institutions (as Islamists had strongly opposed what they viewed as a secular regime),
Hussein wished to “hollow them out, and then repurpose them as instruments of the regime’s
power.”29 In the Sunni areas of Iraq, the Ba’athists were quite successful. As mentioned earlier,
Nasr described Sunnism thought as one in which “religion does not depend on the quality of
political authority but on its ability to help the faith survive and grow.” Thus to Iraq’s Sunnis,
Hussein’s Ba’athism was promoting Islam, by fastening it to his strong nationalist dogma.
However, Ba’athism encountered much more resistance in Iraq’s Shia areas. Shias adhere more
to political quietism, and as previously mentioned, they believe that a political authority should
also be deeply religious, which Saddam simply was not. Rather, Saddam viewed Islam as a
means to an Arab unification end, rather than as a way of constructing civil life.
Although Shias accounted for the majority of Iraq’s Muslims, they were marginalized
and targeted under Saddam’s Hussein’s brutal reign. A Sunni himself, Hussein grew up in a
climate distrustful of Shias, often regarding them as non-Iraqi and non-Arab as many of them
spoke Persian and had connections to Iran.30 To him, Shias posed an active threat to the
Ba’athism’ pan-Arabist credo he believed was necessary to avoid Arab demise. Many believe
that Hussein’s distrust of Iran led to his distrust of Shia, but Nasr argues that Shia suspicion has
been in play much longer and is not specific to Iraq, “Arab nationalism holds an inherent bias
against the Shia. Shias whose mother tongue is Arabic are not by that fact equal members of the
Arab nation. The pull of sectarianism is too strong, and they are among the distrusted quasi-

28

Samuel Helfont, “The Legacy of Saddam’s Islam,” The Caravan no.1820, The Hoover Institution, December 4,
2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/legacy-saddams-islam.
29
Ibid.
30
Polk, 119-120.
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outsiders, the ‘Arabs of the Second Class’.”31 Nasr attributes this second-class status to the very
beginning of the Sunni-Shia divide. He argues that since the Umayyad and Abbasid empires,
Sunnis were favored politically and that this elitism has transpired and grown into the modern
strong “pull of sectarianism”. According to historian William Polk, “Sunni Muslims like Saddam
and the men around him simply could not believe that the Shias, who had been generally
excluded from participation in the Iraqi state since its inception, could be loyal citizens.”32 As we
know, this Shia exclusion predated the inception of the Iraqi State, and originated when Ali and
his followers were sidelined. This demonstrates that the events that transpired over a thousand
years prior still played a relevant role in shaping Iraq’s modern political history.
Hussein started to crack down on Shia protests and gatherings: closing their schools,
arresting and executing clerics, driving thousands into exile to Iran.33 At one point, he attempted
to regain sway with the Shia community by rebuilding Shia mosques (that he had previously
destroyed), making Ali’s birthday a national holiday, and even proclaiming himself a descendent
of Ali. At this point he was too late, as they had seen their loved ones and leaders persecuted or
killed, driving some to even practice taqiyah (the practice of dissimulation: concealing one’s
religious identity to maintain physical security). To Hussein, this rejection of his efforts was
further proof that the Shia were his enemy. Thus a vicious cycle was created: the more Hussein
was suspicious of Shias, the more they distanced themselves from him, leading him to view them
as even more suspicious.
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***
Hussein’s particular brand of sectarianism had less to do with his own ideological
differences but rather was more of an ethno-nationalist conflict, between what he deemed Arab
(Sunni) and what he viewed as non-Arab/ Persian (the Shia). Hussein adhered to the Ba’athist
interpretation of Islam, which framed it as a means of promulgating Arab nationalism. Shia
ideology rejected this political use of religion by a non-religious figure, which, to Hussein, was
akin to a rejection of Arab identity and automatically made him distrust the Shia (and viceversa). Further, the war between Shia Iran and Iraq made Hussein even more distrustful of his
country’s Shia. This led to a violent sectarian campaign which forced many Iraqi Shias to find
refuge in neighboring Iran, which only reinforced Hussein’s distrust and belief that Shias were a)
not Arab and b) a threat to Arab unification.
Here we can recall Nasr’s argument, “The Middle East will not be defined by the Arab
identity or any particular form of national government. Ultimately, the character of the region
will be decided by the crucible of Shia revival and the Sunni response to it.” While Nasr is right
about sectarianism being the most significant element in defining the Middle East, his
differentiation between questions of Arab identity/ national government and sectarianism clearly
does not hold true in the Hussein case. Rather, Saddam’s sectarian views were compounded with
his mode of government which was rooted in an Arab nationalist obsession. After the American
Occupation led to the end of his regime and eventually his execution, Hussein’s particularly
brutal brand of sectarianism left Iraq’s majority Shia in a state of retributive aggravation, which
would eventually lead to the setting for the emergence of ISIS.
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IV. American Influence

“This is one of the most fractious places you could have picked.”34 Former military
strategist of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Col. Thomas X. Hammes, couldn’t have better
described Iraq.
After the American invasion of Iraq led to the toppling of Hussein’s regime, the Bush
administration decided to instill a transitional government, hoping to secure a democratization
process in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority was established in 2003 and was led by a
multinational force, headed by the United States. The Authority’s mission was “to restore
conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely
determine their own political future and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable
reconstruction and development.”35 Almost two decades later, Iraq still hasn’t realized any of
those goals, in large part due to the very organization that outlined them.
De-Ba’athification
The CPA pursued a de-Baathification process, which ultimately resulted in disastrous
long-term sectarian consequences. The de-Baathification strategy is credited to Ambassador Paul
Bremer, who was chosen as the head of the CPA. Bremer, who spoke no Arabic and had no
history/background with the Middle East, was a clearly unqualified choice to secure what was
the most fractured state in an already complex political ecosystem that makes up the Middle
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East. Yet, the Bush administration still elected to send him, and after a two-week crash course on
Middle Eastern politics, he arrived in Iraq.36 As he flew in, Bremer noted the first image he had
of the country he was now head of, “The thing that was striking to us was the fact that a lot of the
buildings were on fire.”37 Symbolic of the political situation he was about to face, the fires had
been burning for over a month, as there was no functioning fire department. His first day in
office, Bremer issued the first CPA order, which formally ended Baath domination of the
government and integrated the Kurdish and Shia rivals. Many in the CPA felt that the order was
too extreme and risked marginalizing a considerable sector of the population. A CIA officer
warned Bremer, “If you do this (issue Order Number One) you’re going to drive 30,000 to
50,000 Ba’athists underground by nightfall. And the number’s closer to 50,000 than it is to
30,000.”38 Rather than heed the advice, Bremer issued Order Number Two, which dissolved the
Iraqi national army. This decision would essentially be one of the main contributing factors to
ISIS’s powerful military operations, as now 300,000 unemployed armed men with military
training would carry resentment toward both the American government, and the subsequent
American-endorsed Iraqi leader. Thus, with the toppling of the Hussein regime, began another
era of sectarian division which would quickly give rise to a Sunni insurgency and a subsequent
civil war.
Nouri al-Maliki
The future Iraqi leader in question would be Nouri al-Maliki, a relatively novice and
unknown politician at the time. Maliki, who was part of the Shia Dawa party (which had been
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illegal under Hussein), had spent most of his Iraqi political career in exile in Iran and Syria,
where his focus was the toppling of Hussein’s regime. Before Hussein, Maliki had spent his
childhood in Junaja, a small town south of Karbala, in Iraq’s Shia heartland. He grew up
obsessively reading the poetry written by his grandfather, who had been a leading opponent of
British colonial rule. Maliki’s nephew describes the writings as being “about the love one feels
for the homeland, about nationalism… and the refusal to succumb to the occupiers.”39 One of
Maliki’s favorite sayings from his grandfather was “the oppressed must leap like lions and work
hard for the sake of Islam.” His patriotism was not found in politics, but more so in religion. A
childhood friend of Maliki noted “He was serious and virtuous. He had high morals. He used to
teach at the village mosque.” As a young man, he joined the Dawa political movement, aimed at
creating a political party which would promote Islamic values and ethics. This largely Shia
movement threatened the secular Ba’athist party, and it was soon outlawed. One day, a Ba’athist
policeman came to Junaja looking for the 29 year old Maliki. When Maliki heard this, he fled to
neighboring Jordan, and later Syria then Iran, where he would live until U.S. forces toppled
Hussein. Almost immediately after his departure, Hussein began his violent crack-down of the
country’s Shias. Sixty-seven members of Maliki’s family were among the thousands of Shia
victims that Hussein’s forces killed. Maliki’s nationalist and religious upbringing along with his
personal loss at the hands of Hussein’s brand of sectarianism, most likely influenced his own
sectarian policies.
When he returned to Iraq, he became the country’s Dawa party leader. The ultimate
antithesis to Hussein, he was viewed by many as a new Iraqi hero. His personal story also
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reflected a reality of loss that many Iraqis were still reeling from. Thus, he was viewed as the
ideal Iraqi leadership candidate to Americans, who were still emphatically pursuing their deBaathification strategy. Yet, years in exile and his recent election to Dawa leadership meant that
he was a political novice. In fact, his experience was so lacking that when he became prime
minister, Bush organized weekly video conferences, in which he essentially tutored Maliki on
how to run a country. The country that this new naïve prime minister was to inherit, was one of
significant division and violence, with a recently dissolved military and government. It was
essentially a state-less state, the most fractious place one could be, and one that an insurgent took
full advantage of.
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V. The First Insurgency

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

The insurgent in question was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was an unusual candidate to
be the founder of one of the most successful Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Born in
Zarqa, Jordan, Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal (like many jihadists, his nom de guerre “Zarqawi” came
from his birthplace) was known to his neighbors as a “hot- headed street thug” as well as the
“green man,” due to his sleeves of tattoos. He was known for being an alcoholic and avid drug
user, belonging to local gangs, and living off a career of petty crimes. The latter would land him
in jail where he would undergo a deep religious transformation. He memorized a whopping
6,236 verses of the Quran and in an extreme show of devotion, Zarqawi used a smuggled in razor
to peel off his tattooed skin. After his release from prison he eventually ended up in a training
camp in northern Iraq where he eventually caught the attention of Osama bin Laden. Former CIA
analyst, Nada Bakos explains, “Zarqawi is the new start-up, and bin Laden wants to invest. He
wants Zarqawi to use the Al-Qaeda brand.”40 Zarqawi’s profile got a large boost thanks to the
Americans. Desperate for a justification to enter Iraq, former Secretary of State Colin Powell
addressed the UN stating that “Iraq harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab alZarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden.” 41 The claim that Hussein was
harboring Zarqawi or had any link to him turned out to be completely baseless, but it had already
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been used as a justification in the “War on Terror” for the U.S. to enter Iraq. In his speech,
Powell mentioned Zarqawi’s name a total of 21 times, which for a relatively low-level insurgent
was a major ego boost. Bakos said, “Now he’s [Zarqawi] showing bin Laden and Al Qaeda who
he really is…He’s become this iconic person without ever really doing anything.” Ironically, the
man who would become the United States’ number one enemy, was in a way given a leadership
role by the Americans.
AQI
About three months after Hussein’s ousting, a bomb went off outside the Jordanian embassy
in Baghdad, killing seventeen. This was how Zarqawi formally entered the Iraq War. This was
how Americans met their number one enemy (who they had ironically emboldened). This was
how the Sunni insurgency started.
Al-Zarqawi saw Iraq’s mounting chaos and obvious power vacuum as a perfect
opportunity for his insurgency group to grow. The group started its insurgency with the bombing
of the Jordanian embassy but quickly evolved into a mass bombing campaign. Soon after the
initial bombing, the group pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s successful al-Qaeda terrorist
group. Ayman al-Zawahiri (bin Laden’s second in command and a co-founder of al-Qaeda), sent
a letter to al-Zarqawi. In this letter al-Zarqawi perfectly captured the political and social state of
Iraq, “In general Iraq is a political mosaic, an ethnic mixture, and scattered confessional and
sectarian disparities that only a central authority and an overpowering ruler have been able to
lead, beginning with Ziyad Ibn Abihi (tr. note: 7th century A.D.) and ending with Saddam. The
future faces difficult choices. It is a land of great hardships and difficulties for everyone, whether
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he is serious or not.”42 Interestingly, Zawahiri referenced a political figure from the Umayyad
dynasty, once again proving how much relevance the history of the sectarian divide still has. AlZawahiri understood what the Americans did not- that a strong central government was
necessary for this diverse population, and thus capitalized on this American ignorance. This is
how the Sunni insurgency in Iraq started, with this new enemy a local product of a foreign
created power vacuum, already strategically ahead of the U.S. military as it understood that its
greatest weapon would be Iraqi society. For more information on AQI’s military strategy please
see Appendix A.
AQI also found recruitment to be a byproduct of the insurgency. With unemployment
rates rising due to the violence and lack of political infrastructure, AQI was able to entice several
civilians to join their jihad with the promise of protection and cash : “‘I was out of work and
needed the money,’ said Abu Nawall, the nom de guerre of an unemployed metal worker who
was paid as much as $1,300 a month as an insurgent… ‘How else could I support my family?’”43
Most importantly, however, AQI capitalized on the de-Baathification fallout. As
previously stated, over 300,000 men lost their jobs when Bremer de-professionalized the Iraqi
Army. Well-trained, armed, unemployed, and upset at the Americans and Maliki, these men were
the ideal recruiting pool for Zarqawi’s insurgency.

War on the Shia
In a 2005 speech, Zarqawi declared a specific war: “This is a call to all the Sunnis in Iraq:
Awaken from your slumber, and arise from your apathy. You have slept for a long time. The
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wheels of war to annihilate the Sunnis have not and will not halt…Since the government of the
descendant of Ibn Al-'Alqami…has declared a total war against the Sunnis… the organization
(ISIS) has decided to declare a total war against the Rafidite Shi'ites throughout Iraq, wherever
they may be.”44 Ibn al-Alqami was the last ruler of the Abbasid Caliphate and was a devout Shia.
Zarqawi refers to Iraq’s Shias as his descendants, once again proving that the historical events
that led to the schism are still very fresh and influential in the rise of ISIS.
Zarqawi’s primary strategy was to instigate a civil war between the country’s Sunnis and
Shia. In a letter to bin Laden, Zarqawi explicitly outlined his strategy, “If we succeed in dragging
them [the Shia] into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive
Sunnis.”45 Zarqawi’s first act of war on the Shia was the bombing of the Mosque of Imam Ali,
which houses Ali ibn Talib’s body and is considered one of the holiest Shia sites. Over one
hundred people were killed, including Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a prominent Shia
leader.46 This first attack quickly earned him the nickname, “The Sheikh of the Slaughterers.”
Zarqawi’s offensive on the Shia was more than just a military strategy. Rather, it
stemmed from a much deeper hatred he harbored toward them. To him, the Shia (along with the
Americans) were the servants of the Antichrist.47 In a letter to bin Laden he described the Shia
as, “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying
enemy, and the penetrating venom.”48 This poignant language demonstrates the deep distrust that
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Zarqawi has for the Shia, calling them snakes and crafty. This language also depicts the Shia in a
very ominous light- their “penetrating venom” is offensive language, rather than a passive
description. Not only are the Shia intrinsically immoral but also an active threat to what AQI
deems true Islam. Zarqawi, and the subsequent Islamic State, believed that “innovation and to
innovate on the Koran is to deny its initial perfection.”49 To him, this “innovation” manifests
itself in common Shia practices that aren’t based in the Quran or Hadiths,50 such as worshipping
at the graves of imams or self-flagellation. Thus, to Zarqawi, the Shia are apostates, viewed as
one of the worse offenses as they are purportedly acting against Islam and Mohammed, while
practicing in their names.
However, whatever his justifications were for waging war against the Shia, his extremely
violent attacks against them were too savage to swallow even for Al-Qaeda. In a letter from
Zawahiri to Zarqawi, the former warns the latter against using excessive violence towards the
Shia:
“Many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering
about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases
when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the
attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him.
My opinion is this matter won’t be acceptable to the Muslim populace, however
much you try to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.”51
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The attack of the aforementioned mosque marked the beginning of AQI’s sectarian war,
announcing a strategy of such extreme brutality against Iraq’s Shia that the leadership of the
already notoriously violent Al-Qaeda, cautioned against excess. Rather than heed Zawahiri’s
advice of constraint, (this disregard for Al-Qaeda’s authority eventually led to the dissolution of
the ties between the two groups) Zarqawi went on to bomb another important Shia shrine, the
Golden Dome in Samarra. According to former CIA case officer Patrick Skinner, this act was the
catalyst for the ensuing explosion of violence, “And immediately, it was within 12 hours that
everything in Iraq changed… It went from horrible to unbelievably horrible.”52 Thus began Iraq’s
Civil War, as “a Sunni response to the Shia revival” (Nasr).
The insurgency ended (for more information about the military strategy used please refer
to Appendix B) when the American military ultimately put the nail in the coffin when they killed
Zarqawi in a drone strike in 2006. Al-Qaeda confirmed his death when they released the
statement, “We want to give you the joyous news of the martyrdom of the mujahid sheikh Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi.”53 Zarqawi died at the age of 39 with a 25 million dollar bounty on his head
and a martyrdom.
American Ambassador, Zalmay Khalizad described the critical role Zarqawi played in
Iraq’s sectarian strife, “Zarqawi was the godfather of sectarian killing in Iraq. He led a civil war
within Islam and a global war of civilizations.”54 However, Khalizad was quick to caution that
sectarian violence continued to pose a threat , “Zarqawi’s death will not end the violence in Iraq,
but it is an important step in the right direction.”
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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi died three weeks after Maliki was elected Prime Minister, leaving
him the aftermath of Iraq’s first modern sectarian war. From the green man to the Sheikh of
slaughterers, to the godfather of sectarian killing, Zarqawi also left an impressive legacy of
terror, and a blueprint for his successor, which would be ISIS.

Maliki’s Sectarian Response

After Ambassador Khalizad cautioned that Zarqawi’s death would not be the death of
violence, he optimistically advised a solution “ I call on Iraq’s various communities to take
responsibility for sectarian violence to an end, and for all Iraqis to unite.”55 However, Maliki
would soon rear his own brand of sectarianism.
President Obama had run a campaign that strongly advocated against the American-Iraq
war, so when he assumed office, he made it one of his top priorities to bring American troops
home. As soon as Obama was elected, Maliki realized that there would be much less American
oversight. He began de-professionalizing the Iraqi army, removing any Sunni commanders and
replacing them with Shia political loyalists, focusing on creating a loyal army, rather than an
effective one. Iraqi’s weakened army would eventually lead to ISIS’s easy occupation of Mosul.
Any check on his actions ended when shortly after his election and replacement of Bush,
President Obama made the call to remove all American troops from Iraq (against the Pentagon’s
advice). By the end of 2011, the U.S. troops left Iraq, along with 10,000 State Department
employees.56 Iraq was now autonomous, and Maliki was left to govern without any limitations
imposed by foreign supervision. One day after the American troops left, Maliki issued an arrest
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warrant for his rival, the Sunni Vice President, Tariq al Hashimi, accusing him of running death
squads and assassinating political enemies, charges he denied. Al-Hashimi was sentenced to
death but was smuggled to safety in Turkey. After clearly being tortured, al Hashemi’s
bodyguards admitted to carrying out various terrorist attacks. Al-Hashemi maintained his
innocence. According to David Petraeus, this was the turning point of political persecution of
Sunnis, “It was a catalyst for a renewed sense among the Sunni Arab population that they once
again didn’t have a seat at the table in their country and that their leaders were targeted by the
government. And that had a very, very harmful effect.”57 Maliki went on to launch a campaign of
persecution of Sunni politicians; Sunni leaders were detained, and the offices of the Sunni
finance minister were raided. In 2012, Maliki’s persecution campaign turned from targeting
politicians, to including civilians. Thousands of Sunnis were arrested on “suspicion of
subversion” and were held for months without fair trial. Many did not make it to jail and were
targeted by Shia militias. Bodies of executed Sunnis were turning up daily, with no criminal
investigations whatsoever.58 This lack of security and lawlessness would eventually explain why
many Iraqi Sunnis would turn to ISIS for protection. Dexter Filkins, author of The Forever War,
attempted to explain Maliki’s sectarian campaign in an interview with Frontline, “The thing to
understand about Maliki is, is that when he looks at Iraq’s Sunni minority, he sees, you know al
Qaeda. He sees the Ba’athists. He sees military coups. He sees plots against him. He sees a
population which despises him and wants to come back to power.”59 Maliki’s paranoia-fueled
political and civilian persecution launched mass anti-government protests in Sunni provinces,
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one of which was the Nineveh province, where Mosul is located, and which was where ISIS
would soon establish its caliphate.

***

Beginning with the succession dispute following Mohammed’s death, to Hussein’s ethnonationalist inspired distrust of Iraq’s Shia, to Maliki’s retributive anti Sunni policies, and ending
with Zarqawi’s religious insurgency vilifying the Shia, a cycle of sectarianism has profoundly
marked Iraq’s political landscape. Rather than argue that sectarian conflict is simply politicized
religion, it is clear that it is a religious ideological conflict that has influenced the country’s
politics.
Both the Relative Depravation theory and Crenshaw’s democratization theory, which are
not religious in nature, are more than applicable to Iraq’s modern conflicts. To reiterate the
former theory, Galtung argues that “ the situation that is most likely to provoke aggressive
behavior is one in which individuals find themselves in a state of disequilibrium along various
socio-political dimensions of status.” Sunnis were forced to face high levels of unemployment as
a result of de-Baathification policies, and watch their Shia counterparts thrive in government
jobs, often times having taken the positions they had previously held. This marginalization led to
strong feelings of resentment towards Maliki’s Shia government. Zarqawi was thus able to
capitalize on this disgruntlement and further rouse sectarian fractures by claiming that Shias
were a threat to Sunnis. Crenshaw’s transitional democracy theory which maintains “In
situations where paths to the legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime’s
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repression is inefficient, revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely,”60 is evidenced by Maliki’s
combination of a lack of free political expression for Sunnis as well as the weak government
institutions that furthered the relative depravation theory (economic grievances).
Both of these non-religious theories can explain Iraq’s fractious state. However, their
indicators of economic inequalities, weak institutions, and lack of political expression are all byproducts of sectarian policies, which is an inherently religious phenomenon. This further lends
credence to Nasr’s argument that a sectarian conflict, seen in “the Shia revival and the Sunni
response to it” would be the defining factor for Middle Eastern politics. The combination of all
these sectarian by-products were thus deeply rooted in long-standing religious differences and
would set the ideal stage for the rise of ISIS.
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VI. The Second Insurgency: Fall of Mosul

Mosul, a city of over three million inhabitants (less than 700,000 after ISIS’ control)61
was Iraq’s second largest city. Over 80% of the city was estimated to be Sunni Arab, thereby
rendering it one of Maliki’s biggest perceived threats. It was thus subjected to many of his
sectarian policies, and so anti-government protests soon broke out. Violence erupted in 2013
when the Iraqi army attempted to shut down protests in Mosul’s Ahrar square. On January 7th,
2013, four protestors were wounded when army vehicles ran protestors over. The next day, the
army fired on the protestors, wounding four more.62 These protests intensified when a Sunni
Mosul man set himself on fire in January 2013. Although he was quickly put out by fellow
protestors and only suffered minor burns, Ghanim al-Abid, one of the Mosul protest organizers
said, “He reached such a state of despair he set himself on fire.”63 His act reflected the 2011 selfimmolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the young Tunisian whose tragic act set forth the Arab
Spring, a movement of anti-government protests across the region. The Mosul protestor’s selfimmolation attempt showcases an atmosphere of deep desperation, resulting from Maliki’s
sectarian policies. Thus, Mosul became the ideal place for a Sunni insurgency to stake its claim.
Mosul officially fell to ISIS June 10th, 2014, after a six day battle with the Iraqi Army.
Many were astonished by how quickly a seemingly unknown militant group was able to defeat
the country’s armed forces. The official fighting was triggered on June 4th, 2014 when federal
police went to arrest an Islamic State military commander; rather than cooperating he blew
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himself up.64 Two days later, a convoy of pick-up trucks, carrying armed ISIS fighters from
Syria shot their way past manned checkpoints, into Mosul. Three days later, the terrorist group
pushed the Iraqi army out, and would assume control over Iraq’s second largest city for the next
three years.
Mosul’s amazingly quick fall to ISIS was a massive embarrassment not only for the Iraqi
government, but also for the American one. After all, Americans had poured billions of dollars
into the Iraq project. Several investigations have since been conducted, to explore how this
incredibly quick fall could even occur (for more information on these investigations please refer
to Appendix C). In addition to anti-governmental sentiments felt by Mosul’s Sunni majority (a
direct result of Maliki’s sectarian policies) most reports have found that the Iraqi army’s (a result
of Bremer’s second order to deprofessionalize the Iraqi army resulted in weak security forces)
sheer lack of preparedness and skill was to blame for this insanely rapid takeover of the city.
ISIS’s original goal was somewhat modest compared to its resulting achievements. Originally,
the group hoped to seize control of only a couple of neighborhoods in the city, and only for a few
hours, with the hope of making a statement that Baghdad couldn’t ignore.65 Instead, the group
encountered a weak army and was thus able to capture the entire city in three days. An
independent Arab publication remarked, “Mosul has proved that the Iraqi army is a failed
institution in the heart of a failed state.”66
Although ISIS’s rise to power and the fall of Mosul seemed to happen almost overnight,
years of poor leadership and a weak military as a result of sectarian policies, allowed this
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relatively unknown terrorist organization to quickly become the most internationally feared
group. The Fall of Mosul is the ideal case to support Crenshaw’s argument that transitional
democratic states are the most susceptible for terrorism. Iraq’s army (which had international
funding and training by the most advanced military in the world) is a perfect example of how
weak institutions can allow insurgencies to rise. To reiterate Crenshaw, “In situations where
paths to the legal expression of opposition is blocked, but regime’s repression is inefficient,
revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely.” We saw earlier that Maliki’s sectarianism blocked legal
expression of opposition. The second ingredient in the recipe, weak regime repression, is clearly
evident in the incompetence of the Iraqi Army which allowed ISIS to even surprise itself in its
shockingly easy capture of Mosul. The American’s de-Baathification policies also encouraged
sectarian policies, which led to the first insurgency. However, Zarqawi’s AQI was not able to
succeed for long due to the presence of the American military, which was able to effectively
repress the insurgency. But when US troops left, allowing Malaki to embark on his sectarian
offensive, resentment increased in the Sunni majority while Malaki’s military forces were
ineffectual, allowing for the rise of ISIS.
At its peak, ISIS controlled territory the size of Britain, with a population of about twelve
million people under its self-proclaimed state. Mosul was by far its largest city, and its most
important conquest. It makes one wonder if ISIS would have even made the news, had only a
few decisions not been influenced by sectarianism.
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VII. ISIS: The Caliphate

Although the battle for Mosul only lasted six days, ISIS would go on to control Iraq’s
second largest city for the next three years, one month, and eleven days. For our purposes, we
will no longer treat Mosul as just a military conquest/ Iraqi city but rather as the location where
ISIS was temporarily able to realize its ambition of establishing their Islamic state. This “state”
would create and maintain extremely well structured and effective financial, legal, and political
systems through a complex system combining brutality (fear) and bureaucracy (order), which
were rooted in a religious ideological sense of duty (legitimacy).

The Religious Justifications for a Caliphate

Two months before he died, Zarqawi had released a video in which he shockingly
announced that he would create an Islamic State: “We bring good tidings to the nation: The
establishment of the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Iraq, which, Allah willing, will be the
nucleus for the establishment of an Islamic state in which the word of Allah will reign supreme."
The declaration was unprecedented, as even Al-Qaeda saw the establishment of a caliphate as a
long ways off. However, Zarqawi’s impatience would materialize about eight years after his
death.
Following Zarqawi’s death AQI underwent a couple leadership transitions and some
rebranding to eventually become the notorious Islamic State. Abu Bakr Baghdadi, also known as
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the “ghost sheikh” due to his rare public appearances would go on to inherit the group, take over
Mosul, and proclaim a caliphate. The latter he did in one of his rare but most important
appearances, speaking from the pulpit in Mosul’s Great Mosque of al-Nuri saying, “ Rush, O
Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because…Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is
Allah’s. {Indeed, the earth belongs to Allah. He causes to inherit it whom He wills of His
servants. And the [best] outcome is for the righteous} [Al-A’rāf: 128].”67 Baghdadi told his
followers that their primary identity was as a Muslim; their loyalties were no longer to their
nationalities but to their God. Baghdadi goes on to challenge the legitimacy of other leaderships:
“from corruption is to be ruled by man-made laws.”68 Thus, even despite Maliki’s loss of
legitimacy with Sunnis due to his sectarian policies, he was still not considered a legitimate
leader, and all those who followed his “man-made laws” were susceptible to corruption. In his
“Give Good News to the Believers” speech, Baghdadi broke down the entire global order:
borders were illegitimate, as were governments and their leaders. All that mattered was God, the
ummah,69 and now the Caliphate to serve both. Oxford Islamic Studies defines the Caliph’s
function as “the enforcement of law, defense and expansion of the realm of Islam, distribution of
funds (booty and alms), and general supervision of government.” Baghdadi took on these
responsibilities, while also attempting to unify the Muslim population under communal
obligation : “this is a duty upon the Muslims- a duty that has been lost for centuries… The
Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it.”70 Thus, the call to join ISIS
was religious at its core. Musa Cerantonio, a ISIS recruiter explained, “The caliphate is not just a
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political entity but also a vehicle for salvation.”71 Baghdadi had effectively framed the formation
of a caliphate as not simply state-formation, but rather a religious necessity and individual duty.
As we can recall from the original Schism section, Nasr explained that to Sunnis “Religion does
not depend on the quality of political authority but on its ability to help the faith survive and
grow.” A state was essential to the survival and growth of Islam. Thus spurred on by religious
duty, recruits flocked to join this new state, tearing up and burning their passports: shedding an
old life of corruption for a new one of salvation.

The Divine Right to Kill

“One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” Although it seems
impossible to understand how someone could view bombing a sports stadium, driving a truck
through a crowd, or a beheading as tools to achieving “freedom” it is important to understand
how ISIS rationalized and utilized violence. The Quran allows for violence only as an act of selfdefense: “fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you but be not aggressive.
Surely Allah loves not the aggressors (The Cow 24:190).” ISIS fundamentally believes that it is
being aggressed; the way of life that God dictated is being threatened by apostates (such as the
Shia) and that it is thus in a sectarian war. Furthermore, according to Islamist Choudary the
beheadings and crucifixions that we view as inhumane are actually strangely meant to avoid
long-term violence, “the state has an obligation to terrorize its enemies- a holy order to scare the
shit out of them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and children,
because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict.”72 To ISIS, this holy war was
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not waged by them but rather on them and it is their duty to respond by any means necessary, as
it is their duty to establish and expand a caliphate. For ISIS’s recruits this is an opportunity to
prove loyalty to Allah, thereby securing a place in heaven and being absolved of previous sins
and assigning meaning to one’s life.
Choudary summarizes the justification of offensive jihad by stating, “Without a caliphate,
offensive jihad is an inapplicable concept. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an
essential duty of the caliph.”73 Thus, in order for a Caliphate to exist/ expand, the use of violence
is necessary.
Nasr remarked that “The Sunni conception of authority has centered on a preoccupation
with order.” ISIS was able to accomplish this order by implementing a balance of brutality and
bureaucracy, both encased in a religious framework.

Bureaucracy

After Mosul was recovered from ISIS, the New York Times published a report
investigating what allowed this young, relatively unknown terrorist organization to stay in power
in Mosul for so long. Entitled “The ISIS Files”74, the report is the result of five trips to Iraq,
contributions from six New York time journalists, and thousands of uncovered internal
documents belonging to the former Islamic State. What these uncovered documents showed was
a highly efficient bureaucratic state, which was very different from the image of chaotic brutality
that the Islamic extremist group advertised. According to the Times report, the self-proclaimed
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state provided a variety of services; it collected garbage (a problem that is currently plaguing the
city), it ran its own D.M.V., it issued birth and marriage certificates (printed on official ISIS
stationary), it ensured that the city’s plumbing and sewage system worked, it ensure access to
electricity, it even built highways (“The Caliphate Way”, constructed under ISIS, connected two
different parts of the city and improved traffic). Residents started to see a change in their city: for
once, things were running efficiently. Muhammad Nasser Hamoud, a former public servant
employed with the Iraqi Directorate of Agriculture, said that he had noticed something that filled
him with shame: “The streets were visibly cleaner than they had been when the Iraqi government
was in charge.” Since ISIS felt it was their religious duty to establish an autonomous state (aka
Caliphate), it thus concentrated on creating such a high functioning bureaucracy.
ISIS was able to run these government services in large part because of its religious taxes
as well as its persecution of Shia (which was largely unchanged since Zarqawi’s first
proclamation of a sectarian war). Its most lucrative tax (for more information on ISIS’ taxation
system please refer to Appendix D) was the religious tax known as zakat.75 Although it is meant
to be a volunteered tax, ISIS made it mandatory. According to the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq, the zakat tax alone generated for ISIS a revenue of about 900 million U.S.
dollars a year.76 A specific ministry was created for the collection of this tax: the Ministry of
Zakat and Charities. Zakat is primarily intended as a charity tax, and although ISIS did help out
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some needy families (only Sunni families, of course), the Ministry acted more as the Internal
Revenue Service.77
In order to finance the city and their jihadist activities, the group confiscated assets
belonging to all non-Sunni residents and distributed them to their Sunni counterparts. One of the
documents that the New York Times journalists uncovered was a manual distributed to
government workers explaining how to seize property from the minority and religious groups
that it had either expelled or slaughtered.7879 The 27-page manual was entitled “The Caliphate on
the Path of Prophecy” and stated “Confiscation will be applied to the property of every single
Shia, apostate, Christian, Nusayri and Yazidi based on a lawful order issued directly by the
Ministry of Judiciary.”80 It is important to remember that this confiscation of property was
considered justified, as the Sunni extremist group did not view Shias as true Muslims; rather,
they were considered to be apostates, as Zarqawi had stated when he made his declaration of war
against the Shias. ISIS considered that they had won Zarqawi’s war and thus they created a
Ministry of War Spoils. This ministry collected and recorded “war spoils” which included not
only deeds to land but everyday household items as well, such as washing machines, kettles,
TVs, etc., all taken from Shias and other non-Sunni Arabs. A large part of ISIS’s appeal was its
promise of taking care of its own. It offered free housing for foreign recruits, and provided
anything they would need, thanks to the war spoils. French Kahina el-Hadra (the wife of Samy
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Amimour81 one of the perpetrators of the 2015 Bataclan terrorist attacks, which resulted in the
deaths of 130 persons82) wrote in an email to her secondary school teacher, “I’m in Mosul and
it’s really the top here. I have an apartment that is fully furnished. I pay no rent nor even
electricity or water lol. It’s the good life!!! I didn’t buy so much as a single fork.”8384 For foreign
recruits who came from modest backgrounds, this was an especially attractive offer. For local
Sunnis, confiscation of Shia property seemed justified, as they felt that they had endured similar
persecution under Maliki. Informants would even phone in the addresses of their Shia neighbors,
with the hope that they would receive some of their property. Mr. Hamoud said that on busy days
Sunni farmers would line up outside his office, “resentful of their treatment at the hands of a
Shia-led Iraqi government.” These retributive actions emphasize the damage caused by Maliki’s
sectarian policies, which ISIS was clearly able to capitalize on.
In addition to the Ministry of Zakat and Charities, and the Ministry of War Spoils, ISIS
also created a Ministry for Hisba. The latter would be the feared morality police that would
enforce the “Prophetic Methodology.” ISIS believed that the key to a successful Caliphate was a
strict interpretation of Sharia law. Every aspect of the penal system was thus judged by religious
experts. A list of Taz’ir penalties (Appendix 1) outlined punishments ranging from civil ones
such as “advise man to attend mosque” for an offender caught outside mosque during prayer
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time to 20-30 public floggings for a man caught plucking his eyebrows. Every individual
accused of committing an infraction, would have to appear before a religious specialist (ISIS’s
equivalent of a trial by judge) who would asses each case. First time, lower level offenders were
forced to sign a form, filled out by the specialist. For example, a man who was caught trimming
his beard (men were ordered to grow their beards) had to sign a form stating “I, the undersigned,
pledge not to cut or trim my beard again. If I do that again, I will be subject to all kinds of
punishments that the Hisba Center may take against me.”85 This system of law and order, which
was rooted in an [extreme following] of Sharia, was welcomed by many who had also dealt with
a rise in crime as a result of Maliki’s weak institutions (one of which was law enforcement).

Brutality

The aforementioned punishments given by the Hisba center would be much more severe
and violent. For repeat and more serious offenders, punishments and executions were publicized.
However, even for minor infractions the civil form-filling was not the typical punishment. For
example, Mr. Hamoud’s daughter was caught in public without covering her eyes. A hisba
officer punched her eye so hard that it left her with permanent impaired vision.
Most importantly, brutality was used as a means to facilitate the bureaucratic efficiency. For
example, all public servants were threatened with punishment or death if they did not resume
their roles: one supervisor tried to plead his way out of the situation by citing a bad back. The
militants told him to show up to work or they’d break his back themselves.86 This intimidation,
however barbaric, was very efficient.
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The group thus created a law and order system which balanced both brutality and bureaucracy
and was rooted in religion (sharia). To accomplish this, the existence of the caliphate was
absolutely imperative. According to Islamist Choudary, “Before the caliphate, maybe 85 percent
of the Sharia was absent from our lives…These laws are in abeyance (suspension) until we have
khilafa (caliphate).”87 In order to implement that Sharia, a Caliphate is necessary. Fawaz A.
Gerges, author of “ISIS: A History” summarizes the danger of this brutal bureaucratic system,
“We dismiss the Islamic State as savage. It is savage. We dismiss it as barbaric. But at the same
time these people realized the need to maintain institutions. The Islamic State’s capacity to
govern is really as dangerous as their combatants.”88

***

Every aspect of the Islamic State was rooted in religious ideology. Beginning with the
motivation to pursue the creation of the caliphate, ISIS believed that the establishment of a
caliphate was a religious duty meant to serve “God and the Ummah” (Baghdadi). The necessity
for a caliphate is also reflected in the Sunni belief that political authority was meant to “help the
faith survive and grow”(Nasr). Baghdadi went further to proclaim that every other existing form
of government was sinful, and that the caliphate was the only legitimate state. Thus, violence as
a means of attaining the caliphate is justified as a) a defense mechanism in a sectarian war and b)
extreme violence is necessary to hasten the arrival of a caliphate by avoiding prolonged war.
Part of the establishment of a successful caliphate required a highly functioning
bureaucratic state. Its ability to provide administrative services efficiently gave ISIS legitimacy
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among many of Mosul's residents who had previously been deprived of such services due to
Maliki’s weak institutions and sectarian policies. The success of the bureaucracy depended on
financing, which came from the zakat tax and spoils from a “sectarian war”, which were both
rooted in religious justifications. Lastly, ISIS adopted a Machiavellian approach to enforce law
and order, which ensured the operation of the bureaucracy. This brutality was in itself justified as
a means of supporting the most divine objective: the caliphate’s survival.
Most of us tend to view religion as a positive and peaceful institution. Thus we find it
very uncomfortable when religion and violence mix, which makes popular statements like “ISIS
is not actually a religious group” OR “terrorists use religion as a coverup for violence’ very
tempting. However, as we’ve seen, ISIS’ ideologies are based in very real core Islamic tenets.
Referring back to Wood’s argument, which I outlined in the theory section, “ The reality
is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic… the religion preached by its most ardent
followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.” Practices like zakat,
the reverence of Islam’s ‘golden age’ caliphates, the Qur’anic defense justification of lesser
(offensive) jihad, are all core principles of Islam and shared by virtually every Muslim. ISIS is a
fringe extremist group, and its interpretations of these tenets have led to unconscionable
violence. However, Woods’ argument that the Islamic State is inherently Islamic is key to
explaining not only its rise, but most importantly its motivations and capacities for creating a
caliphate, which had a regional and global impact.

The Fall of the Capital
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Although ISIS’s rise to power and subsequent take over and command of Mosul was
impressive for such a young terrorist organization, it was ultimately non-sustainable. Constant
bombings and airstrikes began to take a financial toll, and eventually the group started to lose its
appeal. International airstrikes and bombing campaigns targeting agricultural and oil fields in
ISIS controlled territories forced the group to rely more heavily on zakat tax and extortion and it
was difficult for them to continue financing their fighters. Since ISIS had been engaged in war
since its rise to power and due to its heavy use of martyrs, a steady influx of fighters was vital to
counter the constant casualties it faced. According to a report published by the European
External Policy Department,89 this decline in financing had led to ISIS’s shift in focus from statebuilding to military campaigns. Since the religious duty it had promoted was the institution of a
caliphate, the distancing from state-building led to a decrease in their legitimacy. Additionally,
ISIS’s effective administrative skills were incredibly important to its legitimacy factor for many
of Mosul’s residents. With its financial security threatened, ISIS’s recruitment appeal greatly
decreased and thus its attention shifted from state building to military campaigns, thereby
challenging the main legitimacy it had with Mosul residents. With the deterioration of its
financial and administrative appeal, residents could no longer tolerate the brutality of its violent
and strict rule. When military offenses commenced, the group had to contend with several
uprisings from within the city. In October 2016 a group of young men stormed a ISIS
headquarters, killing two fighters and raising the Iraqi flag declaring “Mosul is Free.”90 This was
only one event in a series of uprisings.91 The group ultimately lost control to coalition forces as it
was outnumbered, and its resources depleted (for more information on the 2nd Battle of Mosul
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please refer to Appendix E). However, it left a significant mark on Middle Eastern history, and
would forever change the game for Islamic extremism: breaking the caliphate ceiling.
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CONCLUSION

Key Findings
I began this thesis by positing the question, To what extent does religion explain the
conditions that allowed for the rise of ISIS and its subsequent creation and operation of its
caliphate? The principle findings of this thesis are (1) that sectarian conflict stemming from a
centuries long Shia-Sunni divide allowed for the rise of ISIS and (2) that religious ideology is the
principle motivator for ISIS’ objective of establishing a caliphate, and their subsequent modus
operandi.
Sectarian Conflict: Following the prophet Muhammad’s death a succession dispute arose
out of a rift in ideology which led to the creation of Islam’s two major sects: the Sunni and the
Shia. The Shia believed that the successor “could understand and interpret the inner meaning of
Islam, as opposed to merely implementing its outward manifestations” (Nasr). They chose Ali
who first lost to a Sunni candidate and then was ultimately assassinated by a Sunni extremist.
Ever since this first event, Shias have felt politically sidelined and abused by Sunnis. The
Sunni’s main tenet is that “religion does not depend on the quality of political authority but on its
ability to help the faith survive and grow.” This central credence that political authority is
intended to support the faith rather than interpret it was manifested in ISIS’ quest for a caliphate
and in Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist ideology, which presented the pan-Arabist and pan-Islamist
cause as mutually supportive. Hussein thus became distrustful of the Shias, who rejected this
principle, and persecuted them deeming the Shias as Persians and a threat to Arabs. When the
Americans toppled Hussein, they acted out of ignorance on sectarian issues, by implementing deba’athification policies and promoting the election of Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
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These decisions marginalized Iraq’s Sunni community, created weak institutions, and instituted a
leader who implemented a retributive brand of sectarianism, persecuting Iraq’s Sunnis. A cycle
of sectarian violence, stemming from the original succession dispute and ideological schism,
manifested in Hussein’s oppression of Shia, then Maliki’s retributive persecution of Sunnis, then
Zarqawi’s declaration of war on Shia. This cycle created a fractured society and weak
institutions and thus a landscape ripe for ISIS’ rise.
Religious Ideology: ISIS’ motivation to create a caliphate stemmed from a religious duty
they felt to create a state to serve God and the Ummah (the Muslim community). Because their
main objective was state-building, they focused on creating an effective bureaucratic system,
which allowed them to enjoy further legitimacy from many of Mosul’s residents who had
previously dealt with poor government services as a result of Iraq’s weak institutions. Every
aspect of the bureaucratic system was based on religious ideology. The legal system was based in
Sharia law and judges were religious authorities. The state’s finances primarily came from a
taxation system that included the religious tax (za’kat). The persecution of Shia and other nonSunni groups allowed the state to also financially benefit from these groups’ possessions, which
the State called “war spoils.” These war spoils and the creation of a caliphate would not have
been possible had the group not found a religious justification for engaging in violence, which
the Qur’an allowed only if used in defense. The group thus fundamentally believed that they
were in a sectarian war, with Maliki’s government as the main aggressor. Every aspect of the
caliphate, from the necessity for its creation, to the justification of violence to obtain it, to its
state-building was rooted in a religious principle.
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Other factors also played a role in understanding the rise and success of ISIS. However, I
argued that two explanations--resource scarcity (as posited by relative deprivation theory) and
lack of strong institutions in a transition to democracy (as posited by Crenshaw)--were
byproducts of the religion argument insofar as sectarian policies undermined the provision of
government services and weakened institutions (including the Iraqi military). Thus, economic
issues and political considerations were in fact subsumed under the overriding religious issues,
lending support to my main finding.

Implications
The conflict surrounding the rise and fall of ISIS has led to a dire situation in Iraq. To
stop the cycle of violence and the urge for one group in power to persecute the other, we need to
address the sectarian conflict.
The population of Iraq is the main victim in this conflict. According to the United
Nations’ internally displaced persons monitor,92 there are currently 2,648,000 internally
displaced persons in all of Iraq due to the violence and conflict that have been ravaging the
country for years. The Internal Displacement Monitor Centre (IDMC) describes Iraq’s
displacement situation as “one of the most severe and volatile in the world.”93 A report
published by the UNHCR states that there are over eleven million people in Iraq who are in need
of some form of humanitarian assistance, making up 30 percent of the country’s population.94

92

“Iraq,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq
Ibid.
94
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Response Plan Advance Executive
Summary, (Iraq, 2017), Reliefweb, December 16, 2016,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf (p.811).
93

55

Nineveh (Mosul’s province) has by far the greatest “in need” population, where about 3.29
million people require assistance, whether it be food, shelter, access to medical aid, and so on.
Before ISIS occupied the city, Mosul’s population was estimated at three millions. Now it has
been reduced to between 700, 000 and one million.95 Thousands of people have lost their entire
livelihoods, their loved ones, and their homes. Parts of the city are completely uninhabitable,
with cleaning efforts taking ages. The government‘s resources are stretched thin, having to
contend with conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction throughout the country.
Against this backdrop, the sectarian conflict continues, now with the emergence of Shia
militia, which were legalized as an initial military strategy to reclaim Mosul. After helping to
liberate Mosul, these militias are now attacking Sunni communities, claiming that they are
looking for ISIS affiliates. One Sunni family recounted how Shia militias gathered all men under
70 in their Sunni majority town for “security vetting”, including their five sons. When the family
went to the house where they had been taken, they found 50 of the men, including their own
sons, executed. They swear that their sons had no affiliation with ISIS. The government has had
little control over these militias, who have been accused of several human rights violations.96
There is a risk that if these Shia militias continue to target Sunni communities, it could lead to
either the return of ISIS, or a similar Sunni insurgency. Ayad Allawi, one of Iraq’s Vice
Presidents, describes this potential threat: “They (the militias) became too strong, politically, at
least for now, than the army and the police. It’s possible we will see even a worse ISIS in the
future. More serious replacements will appear, and more dangerous and more cunning and more
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destructive. And this will not only limit itself to this part of the world, it will travel and spread
over into the whole globe.”97 The government must learn from its past mistakes: sectarianism
can have disastrous consequence: If it wants to maintain national security, it must make a greater
effort to exert control over the Shia militias.
So what can be done? The first step is rebuilding the city of Mosul. According to
Krishnadev Calamur, a reporter for The Atlantic, reconstruction investments will need to reach
Mosul and other Sunni dominated cities or else sectarian issues will continue: “As Iraq’s Shiadominated government tries to rebuild, it will want to ensure that these Sunni-majority areas
receive a fair share of reconstruction funds. Ultimately, that might be the only recipe for a united
Iraq.”98
The government, with the aid of the international community, must focus on
reconstructing residences and shops and providing basic services. Without habitable houses,
Mosul residents will remain in their camps. Rather than just donate funds, international
companies can invest by contracting local residents to rebuild the city. This way there is a level
of oversight that will ensure that the money won’t end up in the pockets of corrupt officials.
Once reconstruction and basic services are provided, the economy will hopefully restart on its
own with return of residents. Although this effort seems expensive, it will be much more costly
long term if there is a continued pattern of insurgency and conflict. If Sunnis feel that they are
being provided for by their government, extremist groups will lose a substantial part of their
legitimacy.
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In addition to providing physical reconstruction aid, the government must provide
security. It must prove itself by protecting its citizens from Shia militias. The first step must be to
revitalize Iraq’s security forces and police; punish corruption; ensure proper training, and
establish loyalty to the military, not to individuals (if a commander deserts, his entire division
should not follow suite); and most importantly, replace sectarianism with unification by building
a diverse military that includes Sunnis. Only if Iraqi forces are stronger than the Shia militias
will the Iraqi government have the authority and legitimacy to back the prosecution of human
rights abuses. The Iraqi government must prove that they do not tolerate paramilitary groupsespecially those that engage in sectarian violence. This effort will most certainly require further
international oversight: the coalition forces will have to bolster its training program.

****

The popular saying “know thy enemy” comes to mind. ISIS has for the most part been
defeated. It has lost almost all its territory and its leader, when al-Baghdadi was killed in a U.S.
airstrike. However, though the group may be defeated militarily, history shows that this kind of
defeat is temporary. AQI was technically defeated when U.S. airstrikes also killed Zarqawi. Yet
the religious ideologies and the underlying Sunni disgruntlement were not defeated, as Zarqawi’s
beliefs rose from the ashes to create ISIS. These terrorist groups will continue to rise again and
again, under new leaderships and new names, as no amount of drone strikes can destroy the
pervasiveness of ideology.
Thus, understanding and addressing core ideological motivations and sectarian issues is
pivotal if we want to learn how to permanently stop the rise of Islamic extremism.
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Appendix

Appendix A: AQI Insurgency- Guerilla Warfare
AQI understood that to have any chance of defeating the world’s military giant, it would
have to employ a strategy that the U.S. military has never been comfortable with: guerilla
warfare. A statement posted after the fall of Baghdad, on al-Qaeda’s website, alneda.com (now
deactivated) reads “the Americans were defeated in Vietnam… The successful attempts of
dealing defeat to invader using guerilla warfare were many…these attempts have proven that the
most effective method for the materially weak against the strong is guerilla warfare.”99 Guerilla
warfare thus meant that AQI would use its local knowledge as a weapon against the US and
would use the streets of the cities its members were familiar with to draw the US into a battle it
had no idea how to fight. It hid weapons in mosques, schools and civilian homes and it blended
into Iraqi society, as its insurgents were largely indistinguishable from their civilian counterparts.
AQI had successfully brought in society to war, with Zarqawi explicitly stating, “The servants of
Allah…are permitted to use any and all means necessary to strike the active unbeliever
combatants…The goal must be pursued even if the means to accomplish it affect both the
intended active fighters and unintended passive ones such as women, children and any other
passive category specified by our jurisprudence. This permissibility extends to situations in
which Muslims may get killed if they happen to be with or near the intended enemy, and if it is
not possible to avoid hitting them or separate them from the intended Kafirs.”100 This statement
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essentially excused the deaths of civilians if they happened to be in the warzone- which they
inevitably were since the guerilla nature of his combat meant that the warzone happened to be
their homes, their offices, their schools, their mosques, their favorite restaurants.

Appendix B. American Military Response to AQI
Bush decided to send in 20,000 more American troops to quell the insurgency, a decision
which was called “the surge.” The man in charge of this operation would be none other than
General David Petraeus, a counterinsurgency expert with a Ph.D. from Princeton.101 Petraeus
opted not to rely solely on the American military, as counterinsurgency strategy required local
understanding and collaboration. He also chose not to employ the fragmented and corrupt Iraqi
army which now consisted largely of Shia soldiers bent on retribution. Rather, he employed local
Sunni tribes, with the objective of countering the insurgency using local knowledge as well as
appeasing the growing sectarian conflict, by giving Sunnis a legitimate role to play in Iraq’s new
military campaign. He affectionately called these Sunni paramilitary groups, “the Sons of Iraq.”
The Sons of Iraq was comprised of 103,000 Sunni members and cost the U.S. government about
400 million dollars, in addition to a promise made by Petraeus for Sunni political involvement.
At first, they seemed well worth their price. According to Petraeus, there was “a dramatic
reduction in violence, and ultimately, over the course of the surge, the level of violence was
down by some 90 percent or so.”102 These security forces were created locally, and were
comprised of sheikhs, tribal leaders, and other powerful brokers entering into paid contracts with
coalition forces. They would give lists of potential recruits, who were then vetted by U.S. and
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Iraqi officials. About 80 percent of these recruits were Sunni and 19 percent were Shia.103 The
recruits were self-armed and were trained by the American military. To ensure the ongoing
success of this paramilitary tactic, President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed an
agreement that would keep American troops in Iraq till at least 2011. However, Maliki’s Shia
government’s distrust of this majority Sunni paramilitary group was already apparent. According
to a March 2008 pentagon report to Congress, ongoing challenges included “the potential for
infiltration by insurgents; the possibility of distortions in the local economy if salaries are not
carefully managed; and the need for a comprehensive plan to transition Sons of Iraq to
sustainable forms of employment in the [Iraqi Security Forces] or in the private sector.”104 This
was thus a very fragile paramilitary group- one that could turn dangerous if the salaries stopped
or if they weren’t properly integrated into the Iraqi military or government. The former condition
relied on continued American involvement and the latter relied on Maliki’s Shia government
ignoring a history of sectarian violence and opening its arms to a Sunni army. Ultimately, only
8,200105 (about 8%) of the sons have been integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces, and the only
reason this occurred was because of American pressure. Thus, when President Obama assumed
the American presidency and pulled out of Bush’s previous agreement with Maliki to maintain
an American presence in Iraq, things had quickly gone south.

Appendix C: 1st Battle of Mosul
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A special report investigation how Mosul fell, was conducted by Ned Parker, Isabel
Coles, and Raheem Salman for Reuters Agency.106 Mosul’s first line of defense was the sixth
brigade of the Third Iraqi Army division. On paper, the brigade consisted of 2,500 men, in reality
it was only comprised of 500. At this time, ISIS’s original hundreds of fighters had reached
almost 2,000, as they were met by sympathetic Sunni Mosul residents, angry at the government
and realizing that peaceful protests weren’t helping their situation. As ISIS gained territory, it
seized the army’s weapons. However, this wouldn’t have made a difference, as they were already
better armed than the Iraqi Special Forces (ISF). The head of the fourth battalion, charged with
the defense of the western side of the Tamoz 17 neighborhood, Colonel Dhiyab Ahmed al-Assis
al-Obeidi, reported “In my entire battalion we have one machine gun. In each pickup they (ISIS
militants) had one.”107 Another problem was ghost soldiers. Thanks to a heavy corruption
culture, enlisted men on the books would pay their officers half their salaries in return for being
able to not show up without reprimand. There were supposed to be about 25,000 soldiers and
police in the city, in reality there were at best 10,000. Mahdi al-Gharrawi, the operational
commander for Nineveh province (where Mosul is located), quickly assessed Mosul’s dire
situation and requested reinforcement from Baghdad. Keeping with its original pattern of neglect
towards the region, Baghdad simply responded that the Iraqi Special Forces could handle any
scenario. Instead of sending more men or arms, Maliki sent in a change of command. General
Abboud Qanbar, the deputy chief of staff at the defense ministry and Lieutenant Ali Ghaidan
Majid, commander of Iraqi ground forces formally took control of the Mosul command on June
7th. Qanbar was a member of Maliki’s tribe, while Ghaidan was108 a longtime colleague of
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Maliki’s; keeping in line with the theme of corruption and favoritism. On June 8th, the Nineveh
governor, Atheel Nujaifi asked general al-Gharrawi why he had not yet counter-attacked. The
response; “there are not enough forces”. Perhaps the most unnerving aspect of the whole
situation, was that there was actually a chance to change that. The president of Kurdistan,
Massoud Barzani had offered to send in Kurdish Peshmarga fighters to help defend Mosul.
Prime Minister Maliki rejected the offer not once, but twice. United Nations and U.S. diplomats
even attempted to convince Maliki to accept the help. However, suspicious of the Kurd’s
motives, Maliki insisted that there were more than enough Iraqi Special Forces, a statement that
was being constantly refuted by those on the ground in Mosul. Another poor decision that may
have greatly contributed to the fall of Mosul was Ghaidan and Qabani’s decision to fire a
commander who was in charge of 6,000 men. Although many of these 6,000 had already
deserted their posts, the decision to fire a divisional commander in the midst of conflict was a
poor one, especially in a military climate where soldiers are more loyal to their commanders than
to the army. General Babakir Zebari, the chief of Staff for armed forces in Baghdad chastised the
decision, explaining, “In crisis, you can’t replace the commander.” Although Mosul’s fate was
partly decided when ISIS militants easily stormed past the city’s security checkpoints, it was
sealed on June 9th, with an arguably poor decision made again by Ghaidan and Qanbar. The two
men decided to move their troops to the better secured eastern Mosul. The city is split down the
middle by the Tigris river, creating a well-defined western and eastern division. They stripped
Gharawi of 46 men and 14 pickup trucks and Humvees, which was the majority of his already
small security detail. According to Gharrawi this retreating convoy made it seem like the Iraqi
security forces were deserting. Soldiers concluded that their leaders were fleeing, and thus
actually deserted their posts, in both eastern and western Mosul. Gharrawi chastises the decision,
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saying “This is the straw that broke the camel’s back. This was the biggest mistake.”109 That
night, Ghaidan and Qanbar left Mosul for good and retreated to Kurdistan. General Zebari also
cites this poor leadership as the losing strategy, stating, “Of course once the commander leaves
the soldier behind, why would you want to fight? The senior commander is the brains of the
operation. Once he runs, the whole body is paralyzed.”110 Despite the clear mistakes made by the
two commanders, Baghdad decided to protect them and place the blame on Gharrawi. Maliki
even promoted Qanbar. Gharawi was officially dismissed from his position for “failure to fulfill
professional and military duties.”111 An independent Arabic publication has defended the general
stating, “Gharawi is a scapegoat and victim of agreements and alliances that keep Iraq’s political
and military elite in position, while Ghaidan and Qanbar (al-Maliki’s trusted) have been referred
to retirement.”112 The source further accuses the government of favoritism and explains the
dangers of such decisions, “The decision to punish him (Gharrawi) and ignore the role of high
ranking officials makes it clear not only how difficult it is to rebuild the armed forces, but also
shows why the country faces the danger of disintegration, while Mosul has proved that the Iraqi
army is a failed institution in the heart of a failed state.”
The fall of Mosul to ISIS can be attributed to two main determinants. The first being a
persisting environment of persecution of Iraq’s Sunnis, under Maliki’s sectarian leadership. This
marginalization and systematic persecution led to an isolated community with deep antigovernment sentiments and a sense of hopelessness. Maliki’s access to power and ensuing
sectarian and violent treatment towards the country’s Sunnis was, without a doubt, the result of
American involvement and poor decision making. The lack of American awareness surrounding

109

Ibid.
Ibid.
111
Ibid.
112
 اﻟﻘﺎﺋﺪ اﻟﻘﺎﺗﻞ ﻛﺒﺶ ﻓﺪاء اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻜﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺮاق،ﻣﮭﺪي اﻟﻐﺮاوي
110

64

the absolute necessity for a peaceful transition in the face of recovery from an equally brutal
sectarian regime under Saddam Hussein allowed for the rise of a character such as Maliki. A
man who harbors deep resentment for Sunnis and Baathists, and a man who had virtually no
political experience. President Obama’s further decision to quickly remove all American troops
and supervision over Maliki further exacerbated the situation, as the American trained Sunni
paramilitary group, the “Sons of Iraq” were then persecuted by Maliki and eventually pushed
towards ISIS. The poor decisions made by this foreign entity would greatly contribute to the
Maliki’s sectarian leadership and would push thousands of Iraqi Sunnis into ISIS’s arms. The
Maliki’s removal of Sunni political representation, coupled with the Iraqi army’s decision to shut
down peaceful protestors with violence would lead several Mosul residents to feel out of options,
setting the perfect scene for ISIS to come in and offer one last resort. The second determinant
was a series of poor military decisions and overall lack of preparedness and an underestimation
of the severity of the threat that ISIS posed. The lack of resources and arsenal is relatively more
understandable, as the Iraqi military was already stretched thin, given the sheer amount of
conflict and violence plaguing the nation. Importantly, this violence was primarily sectarian
driven, and could have thus been avoided had there either been more American oversight, or had
Maliki decided to undertake another leadership approach. Yet, for the specific analysis of the
battle of Mosul, the lack of resources can be excused. The ensuing decisions taken by Maliki and
his administration can be blamed for the fall of the city. Maliki’s first decision to refuse Kurdish
aid, a lucky solution to the aforementioned lack of resources, further proves his distrustful,
divisive and sectarian leadership style, and his clear disregard/sacrifice for effective solutions, if
it means collaborating with those he does not trust. Maliki would rather sacrifice the security of
his country before working with those who slightly threaten the legitimacy of his leadership. The
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next in a series of poor decisions was Maliki’s decision to send in General Abboud Qanbar and
Lieutenant Ali Ghaidan Majid to take command of the defense of Mosul. This decision was
clearly made out of favoritism, once again demonstrating Maliki’s pattern of corrupt and poor
leadership. The following decision made by these two men to retreat to Eastern Mosul and
remove virtually all resources from the Western part of the city would prove to be the most
disastrous decision. In a military environment where desertion is common practice, and soldiers
are dependent on the direction of their commanders, this decision made it seem as if the highest
commanders were abandoning their posts. Out of confusion and fear, thousands of soldiers
deserted their posts, thus destabilizing the already weak structure of the military. In just one
night, the two commanders found themselves essentially without an army, due to this decision,
and they were forced to leave Mosul entirely.

Appendix D. ISIS’ Taxation System
Thanks to ISIS’ meticulous record-keeping, it is possible to understand how they were
able to finance their activities and attract foreign members. Contrary to popular opinion, the
majority of their revenue did not come from the oil fields in their territory. The majority of
ISIS’s revenue came from taxation. In addition to the religious tax, ISIS heavily taxed of
agricultural products and properties. The “ISIS Files” describes this lucrative process by giving
the following example of the taxation process of the supply chain of flour:
“Before a single seed of grain, for example, was sown the group collected rent for the
fields it had confiscated. Then, when the crops were ready to be threshed, it collected a harvest
tax. It did not stop there. The trucks that transported the grain paid highway tolls. The grain was
stored in silos, which the militants controlled, and they made money when the grain was sold to
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mills, which they also controlled. The mills ground the grain into flour, which the group sold to
traders. Then the bags of flour were loaded onto trucks, which traversed the caliphate, paying
more tolls. It was sold to supermarkets and shops, which were also taxed. So were the consumers
who bought the finished product.”
The report showed that, thanks to this heavily controlled taxation process, the group was
able to bring in a revenue of 1.9 million dollars in a single 24-hour period from the sale of barley
and wheat. ISIS even taxed damaged crops- at one point taking in 14,000 dollars from wheat
scorched by a bombing. A study conducted by the Centre d’analyse du terrorisme (CAT) shows
that the group made as much as $800 million in annual tax revenue.113

Appendix E: 2nd Battle of Mosul
The liberation of the city was the result of a collaboration of several actors. The Iraqi-led
security coalition was comprised of about 54,000 Iraqi security forces (ISF), 16,000 popular
mobilization forces (PMF) and 40,000 Peshmerga fighters (appendix 2).114 The popular
mobilization forces is essentially a coalition of some 40 Shia militia groups.115 The Peshmerga
fighters are the military forces of the federal region Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition, a U.S.-led
international coalition, the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)
has provided logistical and air support, troops, military personnel, and intelligence. This
combined joint task force has the explicit task of defeating ISIS.116 For the specific mission of
defeating ISIS in Iraq the task force created a training program called the Capacity Building
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Mission Iraq. Since its start in 2014, the program has trained over 65,000 Iraqi Security
Forces.117 The coalition set up a base 60 kilometers south of Mosul at the Qayyarah Airfield
West (Q-West)118, where 560 U.S. troops from the 101st Airborne division119 and 200 French
soldiers were deployed.120 Additionally, the U.S. deployed HIMARS rocket launchers M777
Howitzers and the French deployed four CEASAR howitzers to the airbase.121 The French
deployed a further 150 troops to train Peshmerga forces in Erbil (86 km east of Mosul).122 A
further 80 Australian special forces soldiers and 210 Canadian Special Operations Forces
Command were deployed to assists Peshmerga forces. All in all the international coalition
contributed about 2,500 troops. Thanks to this mass international and national collaboration, the
coalition forces outnumbered ISIS fighters ten to one.123 The Mosul Eye, a clandestine blog
reporting from within the city, estimated the number of ISIS fighters to be between 8,000 and
9,000 and according to blog’s founder, Rasha al-Aqeedi, “Half of them are highly trained, and
the rest are either teen-agers or not well trained. About ten per cent of the fighters are foreign
(Arabs and non-Arabs). The rest are Iraqis. Most are from Nineveh's townships and districts.”124
However, though they were greatly outnumbered, ISIS fighters would not back down easily. The
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group would hold a strong line of defense for the ensuing nine months, which resulted in at least
1,200 casualties for the Iraqi Security Forces125 and the physical destruction of much of the
city.126 The Deputy Commanding Director of CJTF-OIR compared the violence of the last battles
for the liberation of Mosul to battles fought in World War II, “ One has to go back to the Second
World War, to find a (a battle) that compares to the battle of Mosul.”127
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